Body: II. Social Theories by Lysaught, M. Therese
Loyola University Chicago 
Loyola eCommons 
Institute of Pastoral Studies: Faculty 
Publications and Other Works Faculty Publications 
1995 
Body: II. Social Theories 
M. Therese Lysaught 
Loyola University Chicago, mlysaught@luc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/ips_facpubs 
 Part of the Religion Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lysaught, M. Therese. Body: II. Social Theories. Encyclopedia of Bioethics 2 ed., , : 300-305, 1995. 
Retrieved from Loyola eCommons, Institute of Pastoral Studies: Faculty Publications and Other Works, 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Loyola eCommons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Institute of Pastoral Studies: Faculty Publications and Other Works by an authorized 
administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. 
Author Posting © Simon and Schuster Macmillan, 1995. 
3 00 BODY: Social Theories 
II. SOCIAL THEORIES 
Everywhere one looks in medicine, one finds bodies. 
Not only are bodies ubiquitous, they are essential to the 
practice of medicine. Whenever something seems to go 
awry with our bodies, we seek the services of medicine 
and become "patients." Medical personnel often reduce 
patients' bodies to the particular problems they present, 
for example, "the coronary bypass in room 14B" or the 
"end~stage renal disease case." Bodies are the material 
upon or through which medicine is practiced: clinicians 
touch, scan, listen to, cut into, comfort, rehabilitate, 
alter, and monitor the bodies of patients. Likewise, prac# 
titioners bring their bodies with them when they enter 
the clinic. Clinicians not only interact with patients and 
families through their bodies (e.g., shaking hands, 
touching, probing, lifting, bathing patients), they also 
bring to the clinical setting their own unique embodied 
experience-gendered, professional, perhaps overtired, 
young or old, ill or healthy, angry or compassionate, 
prejudiced, and so on. Thus, the body is an indispens-
able component of those persons experiencing illness 
and those giving care, as well as to the dynamics of ill .. 
ness and healing. Without a body, there is no person, 
no identity, no relationship, no health, no illness, no 
healing. 
Yet despite the fact that bodies are so central to 
medicine, "the body" is rarely mentioned in the litera .. 
ture of bioethics. Discussions in bioethics generally cen .. 
ter on concepts of personhood (Is the patient a person? 
Is the person competent?), issues related to personhood 
(such as autonomy, informed consent, rights, confiden .. 
tiality, choice), and questions of cost/benefit analysis 
(Do the benefits outweigh the risks? How can we 
achieve the greatest good for the greatest number at the 
lowest cost?). A patient's "personhood" is generally 
understood in terms of rationality or mental capacity 
(rather than, for example, a beating heart, membership 
in the species homo sapiens, or one's ability to form emo.-
tional bonds to others), personal values and preferences 
(rather than, for example, obligations based on relation-
ships or social roles), and ability to function autono .. 
mously rather than, alternatively, one's ability to 
recognize and to function within our essential interde.-
pendence and interrelatedness). 
Moreover, because "personhood" has been so nar .. 
rowly defined, and because bioethics has made person.-
hood its central category, many of the significant 
problems in bioethics center on bodies whose status 
as "persons" is unclear, bodies that lack or have lost 
rationality, for example: "defective" neonates, anence.-
phalic newboms1 brain.-dead potential organ donors, pa .. 
tients in persistent vegetative state, fetuses to be aborted 
or experimented on, mentally handicapped and incar.-
cerated individuals to be used as research subjects, or 
elderly individuals suffering from dementia or Alz-
heimer's disease. When these patients have not left ra .. 
tional and autonomous specifications of what their 
preferences would be (e.g., living wills, organ donor 
cards), other individuals possessing rationality, prefer .. 
ence, and autonomy (either patient surrogates or the 
courts) decide what to do with their bodies. 
There is a growing consensus that this notion of per.-
sonhood is too narrow, and that by excluding attention 
to the body, bioethics does not fully take into account 
all the morally significant dimensions of the practice of 
medicine. If we cannot be a self or act in the world with-
out our body, then that body must be included inro the 
description of the moral situation. At the same time, 
there is a concern that, in spite of the rhetoric of free .. 
dom, personal fulfillment, and rights, by overlooking 
the body, medicine and bioethics can become (some 
would say "have become") avenues through which so .. 
ciety restricts the freedom of its members through repres.-
sion and control. 
The body in medicine and bioethics: 
Empiricist materialism 
The fact that the body is overlooked is due in large part 
to the ways in which the body is understood by medi-
cine, bioethics, and contemporary Western culture. 
Richard Zaner has provided a helpful outline of the de-
velopment of the view of the body that dominates con-
temporary medicine and is shared by bioethics (Zaner, 
1994 ). This view is called "empiricist materialism" and 
is chiefly the legacy of, among others, Francis Bacon 
(1561-1626) and Rene Descartes (1596-1650). A third 
philosopher who has also been influential in shaping 
how bioethics approaches the body is John Locke 
(1632-1704). 
Francis Bacon is credited with the development of 
the modern scientific experimental method. The devel .. 
opment of this method required a new understanding of 
the meaning of "nature." Bacon demythologized nature, 
declaring it to be little more than brute, inert, morally 
neutral, raw material, available to be dissected and ma .. 
nipulated through empirical investigation in order to 
gain knowledge of its universal laws and regularities. 
Such knowledge is power, Bacon proposed, for in spite 
of its status as totally object, nature was also understood 
as containing within it great power, chaotic power that 
threatened to undo the orderliness of civilization (take, 
e.g., the destructive power of tornadoes, earthquakes, 
and illness). As the human mind gamed knowledge of 
nature, through rational empirical investigation and 
quantification, this power could be channeled and con .. 
trolled, thus giving humanity power over nature and 
making it fulfill human needs. 
One aspect of nature affected by this change in un-
derstanding was the human body. The body, understood 
as inert, morally neutral raw material, became likewise 
amenable to scientific investigation and control. This 
reconceptualization of the body was accelerated by the 
work of Descartes. Descartes asserted that the mind (or 
soul) is both entirely distinct from and morally superior 
to the body (Descartes, 1968). This view is called 
"mind/body dualism" and exerted a strong influence on 
the development of Western philosophy. Allied to this 
mind/body dualism was Descartes's view of the body as 
a machine (Descartes, 1968). 
This Cartesian metaphor of the body as a machine, 
in conjunction with Baconian empiricism, has been 
greatly influential in medical research and contemporary 
medicine. Medicine has made significant progress by un~ 
derstanding the body as being comprised of separable 
and identifiable mechanisms. Because the body has been 
understood as natural and universal, medical science has 
been able to conduct empirical investigation of the 
body, yielding statistical standards defining the "normal" 
human body and methods by which medicine can ma-
nipulate and control bodies that diverge from those 
norms. In fact, some have deemed the body most 11hu~ 
man" when it is most completely manipulated, con~ 
trolled, transformed, or created by human agency 
(Fletcher, 1971). While medicine has adopted the leg-
acies of empiricism and mechanism, it has been the 
Cartesian view of mind/body dualism that has most 
strongly influenced contemporary bioethics, allowing it 
to focus almost exclusively on the 1'mind," "self," or 
"person" when it defines and describes the issues and 
moral parameters of medicine. 
A third influence on contemporary bioethics with 
respect to the body has been John Locke. In his Second 
Trearise on Government, Locke sought a framework for 
understanding political society. Locke posited that in-
dividuals initially exist in a "state of nature," that is, 
individual and unconstrained, until they consent to join 
an ordered society. While Locke's discussion of consent, 
rights, duties, and so forth are too complex to summarize 
here (see Copleston, 1964a), these concepts and partic-
ularly his notion of private property have notably influ-
enced the worldview of contemporary bioethics. This LS 
especially evident in the way bioethics has become in~ 
creasingly intertwined with the U.S. legal system and 
involved in the formarion of public policy. While Locke 
did not discuss the body as such, his views on private 
property and ownership have been incorporated into the 
subsequent labor theory of value and applied to contem-
porary understandings of the body. For Locke, in the 
state of nature, insofar as an individual invests labor in 
raw material to produce a product, that individual 
receives ownership and utilization rights over that 
product. Correlatively, insofar as the body is a natural 
·! 
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resource, a raw material, and insofar as one's body and 
the bodies of one's offspring are the products of one's 
labor, the body in bioethics is often treated under the 
paradigm of property rights (Campbell, 1992; Engle-
hardt, 1985). 
A contemporary critique: Social theories of 
the body 
If a pnmary purpose of bioethics is to reflect on the 
moral and ethical dimensions of practices and to resolve 
issues that arise in medicine and scientific research, one 
must take into account all relevant factors. How one 
perceives the issues and problems depends largely on 
how one describes the situation. 
Dissatisfaction with a bioethics that employs a phil-
osophical framework rendering the body superfluous to 
ethical and moral reflection has resulted in the recent 
emergence of a number of alternative approaches that 
seek fuller descriptions of the moral situation. These ap# 
preaches employ philosophical frameworks that envision 
relationships-between self and body, bet\veen persons 
and their experiences, and between persons--differently 
than the framework that draws on Descartes, Locke, and 
other forebears of liberal political philosophy. These ap-
proaches (specifically phenomenology, feminism, an 
ethics of care, virtue, narrative, and hermeneutics) are 
critical of a medicine that treats merely "the body" and 
not "the whole person." They are also critical of a 
bioethics that reduces persons to their rationality and 
choice, sevenng the connections between persons and 
their bodies. (See for example, Zaner, 1988, and Leder, 
1990, who take a phenomenological approach; and 
Sherwm, 1992, who takes a feminist approach. For 
fuller discussions of virtue ethics, narratLve ethics, phe# 
nomenology, and hermeneutics, see DuBose et al., 
1994.) 
An additional alternative framework for describing 
"what is going on" in medicine and understanding the 
function of bioethics is an analytical approach called 
"social theories of the body." Social theories of the body 
examine the interrelationships between social orders 
and the bodies within their jurisdiction. To understand 
their approach to the body, we must first discuss their 
broader framework. Every society, they suggest, has an 
"order," that is, integrated structures of power, institu~ 
tions, codes of behavior, practices, and beliefs. The "or# 
der" of a society is also referred to as the "politics" of the 
society, that is, the formal and informal relations of 
power and control that govern a society. 
One objective of every social order is to perpetuate 
(or reproduce) itself. Social orders perpetuate them-
selves by incorporating new members who assume the 
roles, espouse the beliefs, support the institutions, and 
participate in the practices of the society. The primary 
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way in which social orders incorporate new members is 
through the social institutions and practices with which 
they intersect, touch, or agree not to touch human bod~ 
ies. Socia[ practices comprise a broad range of activities 
through which a culture regulates the private actions 
and public interactions of its members: eating customs 
(e.g., fasting or kashrut [kosher laws]), sexual practices 
(e.g., monogamy or polygamy, prostitution, adultery, 
homosexuality), economic structures (e.g., capitalism, 
communism, barter), practices of dress (e.g., Amish 
"plain and simple," clerical robes), judicial and penal 
structures (e.g., public hangings, incarceration, excom# 
munication)i religious practices (e.g., confession, pil~ 
grimage, ancestor worship), and so on. Clearly, such 
practices vary significantly both among and within cul· 
tures ("subcultures11 are groups which adopt unconven .. 
tional practices-practices that are often meant to 
counter the dominant culture). 
Through these practices, those bodies within the ju-
risdiction of a particular social order internalize the or .. 
der's beliefs and become constructed in conformity with 
the order's structures. In every culture, certain practices 
are considered the norm or the ideal, although devia-
tions from the norm are generally tolerated as most cul1 
tures hold to beliefs that are often contradictory (for 
example, a culture that idealizes monogamous marriage 
may also sanction a thriving prosititution industry). By 
participating in these practices, individuals learn and in.-
ternalize the beliefs and norms (as well as the contradic· 
tions) of the culture. The more a practice impinges upon 
one's body, especially the bodies of infanrs and children, 
the more deeply the norms are internalized or "embod .. 
ied," the more unconsciously and effortlessly the 11poli1 
tics" of the culture is learned. (For a display of the 
dynamic between practices, bodies, and social orders, 
see Douglas, 1966. ) 
The interaction between social institutions and hu1 
man bodies n1ay be potential (government), indirect 
(media, advertisement), direct but intermittent (medi .. 
cine, religion), or direct and constant (prisons, asy .. 
lums). Through these institutions, cultures seek to 
normalize, discipline, and regulate both the bodies of 
individuals (in Michel Foucault's term, "anatomo.-poli.-
tics") and the bodies of its total population or subgroups 
("biopolitics" or "biopower"). 
In addition, social theories of the body hold not 
only that thtough practices individuals embody the be-
liefs of their cultures. At the same time, they suggest, 
cultures require different "kinds" of bodies to maintain 
their power structures or they find themselves faced with 
different kinds of bodies that need to be located in the 
social order, and they subsequently "construct'' them to 
fit the needs of the social order. For example, the eco· 
nomic and social order of anrebellum Georgia depended 
upon the institution of slavery. To maintain this order, 
a set of practices designed to construct the bodies of 
blacks as slaves was required to internalize the cultural 
view that understood them as slaves. These practices in .. 
eluded kidnapping and incarceration, physical punish-
ment, rape, total economic dependence upon owners, 
selling individual family members, marginalized and im-
poverished dwellings, and so on. 
In addition, for whites to participate in these prac.-
tices in good conscience and for blacks to submit, the 
practices required conceptual rationalizations that con .. 
structed an understanding of blacks as inferior to whites. 
For example, religious discourse construed blacks as in.-
ferior either due to their "heathen" status or due to their 
descent from Ham, a less privileged son of Noah. Med· 
ical discourse, drawing on Darwinian concepts, asserted 
that blacks were not as advanced as whites on the evo· 
lutionary spectrum, or drew normative conclusions from 
real physiological differences. In short, the order of a 
given culture requires this interdependence between 
practices, discourses, and institutions. As will be dis.-
cussed below, this interdependence is also the location 
for resistance and change. 
While this is a graphic and coercive example of the 
ways in which the bodies of particular individuals and a 
particular group were constructed, social theories of the 
body would maintain that all people's bodies are con-
structed. Feminist theory has been a major proponent of 
this view (see Walker, 1991 ). But because people inter-
nalize and generally accept the norms of their culture, 
they do not generally understand their bodies as con· 
structed. Because of the objective reality of institutions, 
the official status of discourses, and the embodied di-
mension of practices, they see the abilities, constraints, 
limits, perceptions, and experiences of their bodies as 
"natural," "given," "the way things are," "right," or 
"true." 
The primary analytical and ethical category for so-
cial theories of the body is power. Social theories of the 
body understand bodies as the medium through which 
social institutions derive power, authority, reality, and 
meaning as the site upon which power and social control 
are maintained. Bodies, as Elaine Scarry suggests, are 
material and real, while political and social configura-
tions are abstractions, precisely lacking material reality. 
Through the ways in which they intersect human bod-
ies, social orders appropriate the materiality of human 
bodies and gain the appearance of reality (Scarry, 1985). 
The most significant analyst of the relationships be· 
tween power, knowledge, and the body, and therefore 
the most central figure in the development of social the-
ories of the body, has been Michel Foucault (1973, 
1979, 1980). 
While not denying that power can and often is ex-
ercised in ways that are negative, coercive, or repressive, 
social theories of the body instead see power as a per .. 
vasive and necessary part of every social order. They fo-
cus on four other characteristics of power, specifically 
that it is "productive," "local," "continuous," and "cap· 
illary." Power is "productive" insofar as it is that quality 
that enables individuals and groups to act (generally to-
ward their own advantage} and to effect desired ends and 
goals. Power is "local" because it is exercised at the level 
of individual bodies through techniques and technolo-
gies of surveillance (quantification, examination, clas· 
sification, statistical ranking) and discipline. Power 
operates "continuously" because individuals, by willingly 
participating in official practices of surveillance, classi· 
fication, and self.discipline, become self·surveying, in.-
temalizing the normative intent of the practices. And 
finally, power is "capillary" (drawing on the metaphor of 
arterial and venous capillaries that are the smallest con· 
duits of blood flow, feeding the furthest reaches of the 
body); power operates through the most common and 
least formal channels of the social body in everyday 
practices, such as eating, medicine, and sexuality. 
An essential element in establishing systems of 
power are discourses, as illustrated above by the roles 
medical and religious discourses played in the institution 
of slavery. Discourses are verbal and literary constructs 
through which systems of knowledge are established. 
Discourses generally belong exclusively to a professional 
group and are the means by which that profession de-
fines and advances norms for human subjectivity, ac .. 
tions, and bodies. Bioethics would be an example of 
such a discourse. Bioethics belongs to the professional 
group of philosophers, theologians, and clinicians who 
have learned the language. Through this discourse, 
bioethicists have defined the normative essence of hu .. 
man personhood as rationality, and they have advanced 
a system of ethical evaluation based on rational auton .. 
omous action, and so forth. 
When discourses and practices become the exclu.-
sive domain of a select group of professionals, domina .. 
tion by that group is almost unavoidable, yet almost 
imperceivable. Joanne Finkelstein (1990) describes how 
technology, especially medical technology, is crucial to 
this dynamic. Through discourse, practices, and tech .. 
nologies, professions cultivate consumer desires and offer 
the means to satisfy those desires. Yet by exclusively pos-
sessing a desired commodity, those providing the service 
(e.g., in vitro fertilization [!VF]) control access to it. At 
the same time, since consumers have been cultivated to 
desire the service (through what Lisa Sowle Cahill has 
called the "rhetoric of desperation"), they do not per-
ceive the monopoly as dominating or exploitative, even 
though they (I ) are increasing the scope of medical 
dominance; (2) may bear great burdens and costs in the 
process (especially women}; and (3) may end up with no 
outcome (for example, there is only a 20 percent success 
rate with !VF), while the professionals are guaranteed 
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benefits, such as income, professional status, or social 
power. When power becomes accumulated in an insri .. 
tution or professional group in such a way that the group 
can define another's interests, influence individuals to 
act contrary to their own interests, or influence those 
individuals to act in ways that simply further the power 
of the professional group, power becomes domination. 
(For further discussion of the new reproductive technol .. 
ogies from the perspective of social theories of the body, 
see Corea et al., 1987.) 
Application: Social theories of the body 
and bioethics 
With regard to bioethics, social theories of the body will 
prove more critical than constructive. In the above dis.-
cussion of !VF, we have already begun to show how 
bioethics looks different when approached from a social-
theories perspective. Rather than asking the standard 
questions of bioethics (Is the patient competent? Who 
decides? Did the patient give an informed consent? Do 
the benefits outweigh the costs?), it will ask questions 
of power (Who benefits most from a particular practice 
or discourse? Is this a practice of surveillance, and if so, 
for what end? Who has power in this particular situa# 
tion?). It will describe how power functions within med-
ical institutions; for instance, power rests mainly with 
physicians or hospital administrators rather than nurses 
who provide the hands-on, bodily care (see feminist 
bioethics, especially Sherwin, 1992; Holmes and Purdy, 
1992). It will analyze the dynamics of "choice," suggest-
ing what social factors constrain choices (e.g., in the 
case of !VF described above}, and how individual 
choices are circumscribed so as to further the interests 
of institutions and professional groups (Corea et al., 
1987). It will illuminate how bioethics, with medicine, 
functions as an agent of social regulation (e.g., bioeth .. 
ics' emphasis on crafting national policies). 
For social theories of the body, medicine has 
emerged as one of the principal agents of social regula.-
tion, the crucial actor in contemporary biopower. Jn his 
work The Birth of the Clinic (1973), Michel Foucault ex-
amines the relationships between medical technologies, 
practices of surveillance, specialization of knowledge, 
and consolidation of professional power (see also Turner, 
1987). Increasingly, medicine offers treatments for as-
pects of embodied human life-fertiliry, height, bald-
ness, death (e.g., euthanasta}-thereby defining an 
expanding number of human conditions as pathological 
and amenable to treatment and expanding its own influ# 
ence. Even when treatments are not available 1 through 
seemingly benign techniques of surveillance (especially, 
for example, genetic testing), medicine seeks to bring 
all individuals, and increasingly all parts of individuals' 
lives, into its purview in order to "normalize" individuals 
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and populations. The Human Genome Project, the mas.-
sive research initiative founded by the National lnsti .. 
tutes of Health to map ''the" human genome, which will 
be employed as a standard of normality, is just one ex.-
ample. In addition, medicine serves to marginalize and 
control those who are not considered normal. Through 
the judgment and practice of medicine, the sick and dis-
abled are removed from the center of public space to the 
margins-to the home, to the hospital, to the nursing .. 
care facility. Moreover, a movement (advocating eu .. 
thanasia, assisted suicide, and/or advanced directives) 
encourages that those "disordered,, bodies (bodies that 
do not fit with the order of the culture) be moved be-
yond the boundaries of the human community, beyond 
the boundary of life and death. 
It can be likewise argued that this function of med-
icine as an agent of social regulation is bolstered by 
bioethics. Generally, bioethics seeks to create arguments 
and algorithms that justify, rather than challenge or cri-
tique, medical "advances." The discourse of bioethics 
often provides an additional lens by which individuals 
or groups are rendered more or less "normal," often 
offering medicine and society moral justifications for 
practices that further marginalize those deemed nonnor, 
mative. Bioethicists increasingly seek to create a profes, 
sional space for themselves, an area of expertise, from 
which they can exercise benign dominance in the moral 
evaluation of medical and biomedical practices; this role 
is increasingly attested to by the frequency of "bioethi, 
cists" in news sound bites. 
Bioethics from the perspective of a social theory of 
the body, however, challenges this trend. How might 
social theories of the body illuminate the analysis of a 
typical bioethical issue? Joanne Finkelstein offers a co, 
gent example in her analysis of genetics. She notes how 
genetic science promises to improve the lives of individ, 
uals and populations by monitoring and altering human 
bodies at the subcellular level through high technology 
medicine. However, these technologies-for all their 
apparent neutrality--carry with them significant nor, 
rnative power, that is, "the power of determining which 
human lives are more valuable, or in utilitarian terms, 
which individuals are potential welfare burdens to the 
community in the long term" (Finkelstein, 1990, p. 13). 
Genetic screening is a technique of surveillance, the 
penultimate extension of Foucault's "medical gaze." 
Through a combination of screening, intervention to 
abort defective fetuses, and interventions to alter hu, 
man characteristics, genetic technologies undergird cul, 
tural efforts to define and institutionalize "normalcy." 
Genetic science has been granted the ability to define 
which human characteristics are to be defined as path, 
ological or unacceptable, which are open to genetic re, 
mediation, and "which populations will become the 
experimental subjects used in the future development of 
the field" (Finkelstein, 1990, p. 14). 
One might comment at this point that it seems that 
even in this approach, one does not hear much about 
"the body." This illustrates how difficult it is to keep the 
focus on the body. However, what distinguishes social 
theories of the body from other approaches is that they 
consistently begin with bodies-with techniques that 
are practiced on bodies (e.g., genetic screening), with 
definitions of bodies or different types of embodiment 
(e.g., definition of death), with the ways in which the 
bodies of different groups are treated (e.g., access to 
health care for the underserved), with the ways in which 
"political" structures position, appeal to, or ignore the 
bodies within them (e.g., issues of women's health). For 
this approach, the point of intersection between insti, 
tutions, practices, discourses, and human bodies serves 
as the window through which to analyze political and 
social structures, relationships of power and dominance, 
and their moral and ethical effects. 
While generally critical and analytical, social the-
ories of the body may also serve a constructive function 
in the practice of bioethics. For example, analysts may 
use social theories of the body to identify ideological, 
oppressive, or coercive power relationships within the 
practice of medicine; they may then offer alternative 
"politics" that better embody a preferred set of values. 
By doing so, they illustrate how bodies, in conjunction 
with alternative practices, discourses, and institutions, 
also serve as the context for resistance to domination. 
Bodies, as the locus for power, are equally the site for 
control and the site for freedom. However, by illustrat-
ing the complexity of embodied social orders, these the-
ories also indicate how difficult resistance can be and 
how resistance requires community. Those who resist 
ofren find themselves de facto members of a subculture. 
Feminist approaches to bioethics are particularly illustra~ 
rive in this regard (Corea et al., 1987; Sherwin, 1992; 
Holmes and Purdy, 1992). 
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III. CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS 
PERSPECTIVES 
Scholarly and popular thought alike have typically as-
sumed that the human body is a fixed, material entity 
subject to the empirical rules of biological science. Such 
a body exists prior to the mutability and flux of cultural 
change and diversity, and is characterized by unchange# 
able inner necessities. Beginning with the historical 
work of Michel Foucault and Norbert Elias, the anthro-
pology of Pierre Bourdieu, and phenomenological phi-
losophers such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Hans Jonas, 
Max Scheler, and Gabriel Marcel, however, scholarship 
in the social sciences and humanities has begun to chal# 
lenge this notion. Late twentieth-century commentators 
argue that the body can no longer be considered as a fact 
of nature, but is instead "an entirely problematic notion" 
(Vernant, 1989, p. 20); that "the body has a history" 
insofar as it behaves in new ways at particular historical 
moments (Bynum, 1989, p. 171); that the body should 
be understood not as a constant amidst flux but as an 
epitome of that flux (Frank, 1991); and that "the uni-
versalized natural body is the gold standard of hege-
monic social discourse" (Haraway, 1990, p. 146). 
This scholarly perspective-that the body has a 
history, and is not only a biological entity but also a 
cultural phenomenon-goes hand in hand with the in-
creasing number and complexity of bioethical issues in 
contemporary society, many of which have strong reli-
gious overtones. Some decades ago the only such issue 
arose in cases where religious and biomedical priorities 
conflicted in the treatment of illness. Within the maJor~ 
ity population, various groups such as Christian Scien~ 
tists, some Pentecostal Christians, and members of small 
fundamentalist sects occasionally have created contro# 
versy by refusing medical treatment on the grounds that 
faith in medicine undermined faith in God, in other 
words, that since healing should occur only at the will 
and discretion of the deity, human medicine was pre# 
sumptuous upon divine prerogative. This was especially 
